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Abstract 
The  problem  of  many  hands—the  difficulty  of  assigning  responsibility  in 
organizations  in  which  many  different  individuals  contribute  to  decisions  and 
policies—stands  in  the  way  of  investigating  and  correcting  the  failures  of 
government.  The  problem  can  be  mitigated  by  giving  greater  attention  to  the 
design of processes of organizational responsibility. An independent investigation 
can  identify  both  the  individual  actions  and  the  structural  defects  that 
contributed  to  an  organizational  failure.  Then,  specific  individuals  can  be 
designated as overseers, who are held responsible for monitoring the structure 
and making changes as necessary. Three cases—the official responses to terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 
2010, and the financial crisis that began in 2007—illustrate how this prospective 
approach of designing responsibility could work in practice. 
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When  terrorists  attack,  oil  spills,  banks  fail,  and  other  “stuff  happens,”1  we 
naturally look for individuals to blame. But in modern society, the most serious 
damage is usually done by large organizations including governments. Because 
many different individuals in  an  organization  contribute  in  many  ways  to  the 
decisions  and  policies,  it  is  difficult  even  in  principle  to  identify  who  is 
responsible  for  the  results.  This  difficulty  is  known  as  the  problem  of  many 
hands.2 
The  problem  poses  a  challenge  to  the  task  of  assigning  responsibility  for 
organizational failures in government. To investigate and correct organizational 
failures, we need to be able to locate specific individuals to hold responsible. Yet 
when many hands are involved, individuals who may bear some responsibility for 
the harm are less likely to see that they do and less likely to be held responsible 
by  others.  The  profusion  of  agents  obscures  the  location  of  agency.  If  an 
individual  leader  “takes  responsibility,”  as  in  the  familiar  ritual  of  command 
responsibility, he or she typically suffers few consequences (at least in political 
organizations), and the search for responsible agents is often cut short.3 
Some  try  to  avoid  the  problem  by  turning  from  individual  to  collective 
responsibility. This collectivist approach has been prominent in the philosophical 
literature.4  It  also  finds  favor  with  some  writers  on  corporate  law  (Friedman, 
1999-2000). It is claimed to have two principal advantages: If we target only the 
organization, we have identified an agent that we can hold responsible without 
unfairly blaming individuals; and targeted the agent that has the greatest capacity 
to provide compensation and undertake reforms. But this is not really an escape. 
Whether collectivities are considered moral agents or only legal entities, it is still 
the  individual  members  of  the  organizations  who  suffer  many  of  the 
consequences  that  follow  from  the  ascription  of  responsibility,  and  it  is  still 
individual  officials  who  will  have  to  respond.  Furthermore,  if  we  hold  only 
organizations responsible, then either all members are equally blameworthy or all 
are excused, regardless of the degree of their responsibility. - 2 - 
We do not have to reject the possibility of holding organizations and other 
collectivities themselves responsible in some way, and certainly should not rule 
out subjecting them to legal or financial sanctions. Some such responsibility, with 
or without moral agency, is necessary and appropriate in modern society.5 It is 
the  “only”  that  is  objectionable.  We  still  need  to  find  a  role  for  individual 
responsibility. 
Without an adequate account of individual responsibility in organizations, the 
standard  ideas  of  moral  and  legal  responsibility  will  be  violated  either  by 
targeting individuals who are not responsible, or by exonerating individuals who 
may be at least partly responsible. The result is not only unfair to the individuals 
(and  sometimes  the  organizations  as  well)  but  also  undermines  the  set  of 
incentives  on  which  the  organization  and  society  depend  to  encourage 
responsible action. If the incentives are not directed toward actions or omissions 
for  which  individuals  and  organizations  could  reasonably  believe  they  are 
responsible,  the  incentives  and  therefore  the  means  of  accountability  are  less 
likely to be effective.6 That is, responsibility (being a contributor to an outcome) 
needs to track accountability (being required to answer, or subjected to sanctions, 
for it).7 
We can create a greater role for individual responsibility in organizations if we 
give more attention to responsibility for their design. Investigation of the failures 
of  government  should  seek  to  identify  responsible  individuals  as  well  as 
structural defects that led to the outcomes, but with the primary aim of making 
changes in organizational design. The changes should provide greater incentives 
for taking individual responsibility in the future and should designate specific 
individuals  to  continue  to  monitor  the  organizations  with  the  objective  of 
fostering a culture of responsibility. The members of the body that carries out the 
investigations  should  themselves  be  held  accountable  according  to  criteria  of 
individual responsibility. 
Individual Responsibility and Its Limits 
The  first  step  is  to  recognize  that  assigning  individual  responsibility  even  for 
organizational outcomes is not as hopeless as a simple statement of the many 
hands  problem  might  suggest.  We  can  strengthen  the  role  of  individual 
responsibility for failures if we are more careful in interpreting the criteria for 
ascribing  it.  An  individual  is  generally  said  to  be  responsible  for  an  outcome 
insofar as the individual’s actions or omissions are a cause of the outcome, and 
the actions or omissions are not done under compulsion or in ignorance.8 An 
individualist approach that adopts these criteria is more robust in organizational 
settings  than  usually  assumed,  provided  the  criteria  are  properly  specified 
(Bovens,  1998,  2007,  2010;  Luban,  Strudler, & Wasserman,  1992;  Thompson, 
1980, 2005). How they are interpreted and applied matters. 
If we characterize an outcome in very general terms—say, the environmental 
harm from a massive oil spill—we may not be able to identify any individual as a 
cause on a strict criterion. But if we describe the outcome more specifically—the 
failure to take usual safety precautions in drilling the well—we may have more 
success in locating responsible individuals. Or take the excuse of ignorance: We 
should not have to show that an executive should have foreseen the specific act of 
particular  subordinates  (e.g.,  that  the  drilling  team  would  neglect  to  follow 
certain  procedures).  In  organizations,  certain  patterns  of  fault  are  common 
enough that we should expect any competent official to anticipate them and to 
take reasonable precautions to avoid them or at least to minimize their harmful 
consequences. 
Nevertheless, in many cases the problem of many hands persists, because even 
if  the  individuals  who  made  mistakes  and  contributed  to  the  outcome  can  be 
identified, the consequences of their acts (as well as their omissions) are often 
disproportionate to the harm brought about by the organization. The harmful 
effects of the oil spills, the financial crisis, or terrorist attacks go beyond anything 
that any individual may have done or could be reasonably held responsible for. 
Once we apportion blame and apply sanctions to everyone as far as possible, we - 3 - 
would still find that the enormity of the outcome exceeds even the collective sum 
of the actions of individuals. 
The  individualist  approach  thus  reaches  a  limit  in  trying  to  attribute 
responsibility for harm brought about by organizational failure. But so does the 
collectivist  approach  because  it  cannot  escape  relying  to  some  extent  on 
individual responsibility in imposing sanctions and carrying out reforms. Once 
we have reached this limit and exhausted the supply of individual responsibility 
for  an  organizational  failure,  is  there  nothing  more  to  be  said  or  done  about 
responsibility? If no one (or alternatively if everyone) is responsible, no one is 
likely to do anything about it, whatever it is. That is not a promising approach for 
making either individuals or organizations more responsible and accountable. 
The Shift to Design Responsibility 
We can still find a role for individual responsibility if we shift our perspective 
from  the  responsibility  for  outcomes  to  the  responsibility  for  the  design  of 
organizations. The source of many of the organizational disasters in recent years 
can be found in the structure of the organization and its relationship to other 
organizations. But as we go looking for the individual designers, we will confront 
the problem of many hands again. The organizational design is often the product 
of many decisions and many nondecisions by many different people over a long 
period of time. Potential designers who knew about the defects may not have had 
the power to fix them, and those who had the power may not have known (though 
often they should have known). If we look only for design faults in the past, we 
are likely again to find too many hands with too little responsibility. 
Therefore in shifting to design responsibility, we also need to adopt a forward-
looking  conception  of  responsibility—what  may  be  called  prospective  design 
responsibility.  We  examine  past  failures—but  chiefly  for  the  purpose  of 
preventing future ones. In carrying out such an examination, we first need to 
locate, as far as possible, not only the structural defects in the organization but 
also  the  individual  actions  that  may  have  contributed  to  the  failure.  That  is 
necessary  so  that  we  can  separate  the  structural  defects  from  the  individual 
errors.  Then  prospectively,  we  designate  specific  individuals  or  groups  of 
individuals  as  overseers,  who  can  be  held  accountable  for  monitoring  the 
structure of the organization and making or recommending changes in it and the 
organizational  culture  as  necessary.  In  the  future,  if  they  fail  to  fulfill  that 
responsibility, we will know whom to blame, even if the organizational failure 
itself is the result of the actions of many hands. 
The shift to prospective design responsibility can preserve a role for individual 
responsibility  in  many  hands  circumstances  that  would  otherwise  frustrate 
attempts to assign it. However, overcoming the many hands problem in this way 
requires more than merely adding design responsibility to the job descriptions of 
existing officers and members of the organization. It requires establishing new 
offices  or  institutions  with  individuals  specifically  charged  with  overseeing 
organizational  changes  to  correct  structural  deficiencies  that  could  result  in 
disastrous failures. Ironically, it requires creating more hands—but with more 
precisely defined responsibilities. 
How  design  responsibility  could  work  can  be  shown  by  examining  its 
application  in  three  different  cases  of  major  governmental  failure:  the  official 
responses to terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill in 2010, and the financial crisis that began in 2007.9 In each 
case, an official body was appointed to investigate the failure, and some of these 
bodies came closer than others to following the approach proposed here. The aim 
here, then, is dual: to examine from the perspective of design responsibility both 
the failures of responsibility and the bodies that carried out the investigations of 
the failures. - 4 - 
Unprevented Terror 
After  the  terrorist  attacks  on  September  9,  2001,  that  killed  nearly  3,000 
innocent people and destroyed New York’s World Trade Center and part of the 
Pentagon, Congress created a 10-member bipartisan commission to investigate 
the failures of government and to recommend ways to avoid them in the future. 
The commission’s 567-page final report, issued in July 2004, presented a riveting 
narrative  of  the  policies  and  events  leading  up  to  the  attacks,  detailed 
descriptions  of  the  government’s  response,  and  a  set  of  recommendations  for 
changes  in  the  practices  and  organization  of  many  agencies  of  government 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). The 
initial reaction to the report was favorable. Remarkably well written and replete 
with new information, the document was turned into a book and immediately 
became a best seller. 
But on closer reading, many found the report deficient. The critics included 
not only the families of the 9/11 victims but also a former aide in the Bush White 
House and a senior adviser to the Commission (Falkenrath, 2004; E. R. May, 
2007; E. R. May, Zelikow, & Falkenrath, 2005; Shenon, 2008). The most salient 
criticism  they  raised  is  directly  relevant  to  the  problem  of  responsibility.  The 
report failed to hold any individual accountable; it declined to pass judgment on 
individuals who made the key decisions. The Commission adopted a “no fault” 
theory  of  government—“an  imprecise,  anodyne  and  impersonal  assignment  of 
responsibility for the U.S. government’s failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks” (E. R. 
May et al., 2005, Falkenrath, p. 211). 
The Commission’s decision to avoid singling out individuals was deliberate: 
“Our aim has not been to assign individual blame.” Later, one of the co-chairs 
explained more fully: “. . . if we had come up with a list of bad actors, it would 
have blown the commission apart and it would have blown any credibility we had 
. . . ” (Shenon, 2008, p. 405). Although the Commissioners were commendably 
conscientious and public spirited, the Commission was, in origin, composition 
and foreseeable reception, a political body, and its scope for action was inevitably 
shaped by political considerations. The understandable political calculation the 
co-chairs  made  had  serious  costs.  First,  an  analysis  that  neglects  individual 
responsibility is an inadequate guide for decision makers in the future. Refusing 
to “name names” is “exactly the wrong message to send to future government 
officials and the people who train them” (E. R. May et al., 2005, Falkenrath, p. 
211). More generally, for the purposes of redesigning incentives for responsibility 
in the future, we need to know which were more or less effective and under what 
circumstances in the past. 
Second,  avoiding  discussion  of  individual  responsibility  weakened  the 
recommendations  for  institutional  reform.  The  Commission’s  proposals  for 
change were only loosely connected to its analysis of the failures. That analysis 
relied on very general, impersonal concepts such as a “failure of imagination,” the 
most prominent of the four major “failures” it cited (National Commission, 2004, 
pp. 339-347). Presumably, everyone should be more imaginative. Analyzing the 
“management failure,” the report retreats to the passive voice: “information was 
not shared . . . analysis was not pooled. Effective operations were not launched . . 
.” (National Commission, 2004, p. 353). Responsibility designers would look to 
the  report  in  vain  for  the  agents  who  failed  to  share  information,  pool  the 
analysis, or launch the operations. They would be at a loss to know which roles or 
offices should be redesigned to prevent these failures in the future. While the 
diagnosis generally avoided singling out individuals, the prescriptions did not. 
Many  of  the  recommendations  called  for  changes  that  would  assign  definite 
responsibilities to specific individuals (National Commission, 2004, p. 339). The 
connection between the diagnosis and the prescription remained obscure. 
Bush’s counterterrorism adviser Richard Clarke charged that National Security 
Adviser  Condi  Rice  (and  others)  failed  to  take  the  terrorist  threat  seriously 
(Shenon,  2008).  In  the  Clinton  administration,  Clarke’s  office  gave  him  more 
regular and direct access to the President and other principals than it did in the 
Bush administration, which (in Clarke’s view) downgraded the office. Was this - 5 - 
dereliction  on  the  part  of  Rice  and  others,  or  was  it  the  result  in  part  of 
organizational defect that should be corrected? Similarly, for many of the other 
specific failures described in the report, it would be essential to know why those 
who  could  have  acted  (presumably  a  small  and  identifiable  number  of 
individuals) failed to do so. 
Even if we do not want to discipline individuals, and indeed if we believe that 
some should be excused because of structural defects over which they had no 
control,  we  cannot  redesign  the  roles  or  offices  in  which  they  acted  without 
knowing  what  decisions  which  individuals  took  or  failed  to  take,  and  what 
realistic alternatives they might have had. We need to know who did what, not to 
ascribe blame or mete out punishment, but to guide the design of the roles and 
organizational  culture  to  prevent  future  failures—including  failures  of 
responsibility. The former Bush aide’s critical summary indicates why the report 
could not be such a guide: 
Even if authority is widely and confusingly spread around the executive branch . . . 
the starting point in any after-the-fact governmental analysis should always be the 
concept  of  personal  responsibility.  The  9/11  commission  instead  focused  on  a 
handful  of  amorphous,  impersonal  causal  factors,  none  of  which  is  nearly  as 
compelling as the notion that an identifiable set of government officials made bad 
decisions about where to apply their energies and, as a result, failed to do the job 
that the American people had the right to expect them to do. (E. R. May et al., 2005, 
Falkenrath, p. 211) 
The  experience  of  the  Commission  suggests  several  lessons  for  design 
responsibility and the bodies charged with promoting it. First, if a postmortem on 
a  major  organizational  disaster  such  as  9/11  is  expected  to  produce 
recommendations for organizational change, a bipartisan commission or other 
political  body  is  probably  not  the  best  instrument.  In  this  case,  the  supposed 
advantage  of  influencing  Congress  did  not  materialize.  Many  of  the 
recommendations were ignored, and others watered down. A commission may be 
appropriate, but it should not be so closely connected to the political parties, and 
should  include  experts  and  citizens  rather  than  partisan  political  figures.  It 
should in its own design be more independent than the 9/11 commission. 
Second,  an  essential  aim  of  any  attempt  to  redesign  responsibility  in  an 
organization after a disaster should be to pursue individual responsibility as far 
as possible. The critiques of the 9/11 commission make clear that the possibilities 
for locating individuals who failed as well as those who succeeded in fulfilling 
their  responsibilities  are  greater  than  is  usually  assumed,  even  in  a  massive, 
large-scale disaster of this kind. We do not have to hold individuals responsible 
for  the  whole  disaster  to  hold  them  responsible  for  specific  and  substantial 
mistakes.  Distinguishing  the  structural  from  the  individual  sources  of  these 
mistakes is necessary for the task of designing responsibility. The assignment of 
individual  responsibility  is  the  handmaiden  to  the  prevention  of  collective 
disaster. 
Finally, part of the redesign of any organization should involve specifying more 
clearly which individuals should be responsible for which decisions, and giving 
them the independence and information to fulfill their responsibilities. Some of 
the  Commission’s  recommendations  moved  in  that  direction,  but  their  more 
comprehensive efforts were weakened by their own analysis, which more readily 
suggested impersonal remedies such as the implication that everyone should be 
more imaginative or that Congress should be better organized. The Commission 
suggested  some  specific  reforms,  but  was  often  silent  about  who  should  be 
responsible for carrying them out (e.g., National Commission ,2004, pp. 419-21). 
Spilt Oil 
In April 2010, in the Gulf of Mexico, a deep water oil drilling rig operated by 
British Petroleum (BP) exploded, killing 11 workers and causing a massive gusher 
that eventually released nearly 5 million barrels of crude oil into the Gulf. The - 6 - 
spill caused extensive and continuing damage to marine and wildlife habits and 
to the fishing and tourist industries on which most of the residents of the Gulf 
depend.  The  government  held  BP  responsible  for  managing  the  clean-up  and 
compensating victims, but the various investigations and legal proceedings have 
still not entirely settled which of the several companies and individuals involved 
are responsible for the spill and its effects. 
In  May  2010,  President  Obama  appointed  a  seven-member  National 
Commission to investigate the spill with the aim of “providing recommendations 
on how we can prevent—and mitigate the impact of—any future spills that result 
from  offshore  drilling”  (White  House  Press  Office,  2010).  Although  the 
Commission was called “bipartisan” because the co-chairs were identified as a 
Democrat and a Republican, the composition and the mission were not political 
in the way that the 9/11 Commission was. Both the co-chairs had held positions 
and had experience directly relevant to the environmental disasters of this kind. 
The other members were recognized independent experts, mostly researchers or 
leaders of apolitical institutions. 
Even though its explicit charge was forward-looking, the Commission realized 
that it had to examine the causes, and that such an examination would require 
giving some attention to decisions that individuals had made. The commission 
did not try to assign specific blame for a catalog of mistakes and shortcuts taken by 
the companies and their employees, but it is clear from the report that the major 
agents  engaged  in  highly  risky  behavior  that  neither  senior  management  nor 
government regulators properly oversaw. (Broder, 2011, p. A14) 
The Commission concluded that 
the  immediate  causes  of  the  Macondo  well  blowout  can  be  traced  to  a  series  of 
identifiable  mistakes  made  by  BP,  Halliburton,  and  Transocean  that  reveal  such 
systematic failures in risk management that they place in doubt the safety culture of 
the entire industry. (National Commission on BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and 
Offshore Drilling, 2011, p. vii) 
The list included many mistakes that could be attributed to specific individuals 
or  small  groups  of  individuals,  such  as  the  supervisors  who  ignored  early 
warnings that key pieces of equipment such as the blow out preventer might fail. 
Many individuals had both the authority and knowledge to change the practices 
that  led  to  many  of  these  errors,  but  the  pressure  to  save  time  and  money 
evidently  drove  the  decision  making  more  than  concern  for  safety  (National 
Commission, 2011, pp. 125-26). 
Eventually the numerous legal proceedings began to identify some individuals 
who were more responsible than others, and allocate some responsibility to the 
several corporations involved. But undoubtedly, even the cumulative total of legal 
liability will not be commensurate with the damage caused by the spill. The more 
constructive effort focuses on assigning responsibility for preventing or reducing 
the risk of similar disasters in the future and the first line of response here is 
governmental  oversight.  The  report  of  the  Commission,  which  because  of  its 
relative  independence  and  expertise,  carried  out  an  investigation  more 
constructively  in  this  way  than  did  the  9/11  Commission.  The  report  and  the 
analyses of other observers point to significant failures of design responsibility. 
There were several different agencies responsible for oversight, and no one 
had  overall  authority.  The  responsibility  design  was  diffuse,  which  probably 
contributed to the disaster.  Furthermore, the principal agency for regulating the 
drilling,  the  Mines  Minerals  Service  (MMS),  granted  so  many  exceptions  and 
overlooked so many violations that its officials may be as much responsible for 
the disaster as many of those at BP (Urbina, 2010). The Commission made clear 
that  agency  officials  had  missed  many  opportunities  for  redesigning  the 
regulatory system (National Commission on BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and 
Offshore Drilling, 2011, p. 71). - 7 - 
Although the MMS failures were partly the result of manifest corruption that 
had long plagued the agency, they were made worse by a design problem. The 
agency  was  charged  with  two  different  and  conflicting  tasks:  promoting  the 
industry (encouraging drilling) and regulating it (ensuring that safety was the 
highest  priority).  Even  without  the  corruption,  the  promotional  efforts  would 
have been likely to overshadow the regulatory responsibilities. One lesson is that 
organizational  designers  should  divide  conflicting  responsibilities  by  assigning 
them to different agencies. That is in fact one of the steps that the government 
has now taken in this case, splitting the previous agency into three different parts 
to avoid the conflicts (U.S. Secretary of the Interior, 2010). 
But the problem persists because the individuals who know the most about the 
industry and how to regulate it effectively come from the same backgrounds, and 
often move in the same circles as the people they are regulating. Even if they are 
not looking for opportunities in the industry, they are more likely to see the world 
from the perspective of those whom they are regulating than from the perspective 
of  the  citizens  who  may  be  harmed  by  mistakes  that  the  industry  (or  the 
regulators)  make.  To  the  extent  that  government  seeks  the  most  competent 
experts to conduct oversight, this design problem cannot be avoided at this level. 
Another  lesson,  then,  is  that  to  address  this  kind  of  problem,  we  need  an 
additional body to ensure that some oversight responsibility is assigned to people 
who have a different perspective. We need a body composed of members who 
would give more weight to the effects on citizens, and who are more willing to 
challenge  expert  opinion.  One  method  that  has  been  tried  in  similar 
circumstances is a citizens’ advisory council (Applegate, 1998). Such a body was 
set  up  after  the  Alaskan  Valdez  disaster,  but  legislation  to  require  that  it  be 
established in other regions failed to pass in Congress. The National Commission 
briefly reintroduced the proposal: any new “structure should therefore include a 
citizens’ advisory council to provide formal advice and a direct line to citizens’ 
concerns” (National Commission, 2011, p. 212). The Commission did not specify 
the form that such a council should take, but an earlier report by another federal 
panel set out some of the requirements a council should satisfy. It should be an 
independent public body charged with providing policy and technical advice for 
specific  projects,  sites,  or  regions.  It  would  consist  of  10  to  20  members, 
including  directly  affected  parties,  and  also  unorganized  “individual  residents 
that live in the communities or regions in which [the] site is located” (Federal 
Facilities  Environmental  Restoration  Dialogue  Committee,1996,  pp.  56-57). 
Governmental  officials  would  serve  as  nonvoting  members,  and  governments 
would provide professional staff. 
Thus,  two  of  the  lessons  of  this  episode—divide  conflicting  tasks,  and  add 
checking  authorities—point  to  responsibility  reforms  that  would  address  the 
problem of many hands by multiplying the hands. That solution might seem to 
recreate the problem it is supposed to solve. But the multiplication is not the 
same.  The  difference  is  that  the  hands  would  be  specifically  charged  with 
oversight  and  nothing  else,  and  they  would  be  independent  in  the  sense  that 
neither their mission nor their interest would conflict with their responsibility for 
oversight. 
This proposed multiplication of oversight responsibility for oil drilling would 
occur  on  a  single  level  of  authority;  each  of  the  authorities  would  have  a 
somewhat different function but would be equal in the sense that neither would 
oversee  the  other.  The  type  of  structure  is  what  may  be  called  horizontal 
responsibility for oversight. Such a structure could of course create a problem of 
coordination  and  potentially  give  rise  to  conflicts.  Those  problems  could  be 
mitigated  by  rules  requiring  regular  consultation  and  joint  meetings,  and 
specifying which body takes priority in cases of conflict. 
Rules of this kind could also obviate the need to establish a higher authority to 
oversee both bodies, which would create a further problem. It would in effect 
introduce  a  form  of  vertical  responsibility  to  the  structure.  The  problem  with 
vertical  oversight  responsibility  is  that  it  tends  to  duplicate  functions  at  each 
level,  recreating  the  many  hands  problem.  It  also  invites  a  reiteration  of  the 
question as to who will oversee the overseers, generating a regress of oversight - 8 - 
that  has  no  logical  termination  (Thompson,  2005,  pp.  261-62).  However,  the 
vertical  model  may  be  necessary  in  some  cases,  and  with  the  appropriate 
modifications  can  avoid  these  problems,  as  consideration  of  the  failures  of 
responsibility in the financial crisis beginning in 2007 illustrate. 
Failed Banks 
The financial crisis that plunged the world economy into the worst depression 
since  the  1930s  was  set  off  when  the  housing  bubble  burst  and  a  liquidity 
shortage  developed  in  the  United  States  in  2007  (Blinder,  2013).  Such  an 
immense and complex calamity had many causes, and not surprisingly, the list of 
individuals  and  organizations  that  could  be  plausibly  blamed  is  distressingly 
long.10 The crisis manifests the problem of many hands in its most florid form. 
The  most  prominent  of  the  many  investigations  was  conducted  by  the 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, created in July 2009 by Congress, which 
appointed all 10 of its members (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2010a). 
The  members  had  considerable  expertise  in  financial  matters,  but  less 
independence  from  their  political  supporters.  The  Commission’s  analysis  and 
recommendations were as a result less helpful in advancing the aims of design 
responsibility. Unlike even the 9/11 Commission, it split along partisan lines and 
did  not  issue  a  unanimous  final  report  (Financial  Crisis  Inquiry  Commission, 
2011).  The  majority  report  made  some  effort  to  identify  individuals  and 
institutions that were responsible but included so many culprits that the minority 
report  was  provoked  to  object:  “When  everything  is  important,  nothing  is” 
(Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011, p. 414). Yet the “ten essential causes” 
summarized in the minority report itself emphasized broad impersonal forces, 
such as the credit bubble in the world economy, giving less attention to the role of 
individual decision makers (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011, pp. 417-
419). Nevertheless, the Commission’s report contains information and analyses 
that are helpful in examining the failure of design responsibility in this case and 
potential changes to prevent such failures in the future. 
Although a full assessment of responsibility for the crisis would examine many 
hands,  one  set  of  institutions—the  rating  agencies—merit  special  attention 
because  they  illustrate  how  the  vertical  model  for  designing  oversight 
responsibility  might  be  applied.  The  agencies,  which  include  once  respected 
organizations such as Moody’s and Poor’s, were not the best known villains in the 
popular exposes of the crisis, but their failures contributed significantly to the 
crisis (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2010b; 2011, pp. 43-44, 212, 426, 
418). The agencies were the “reputational intermediaries” who enabled the banks 
to  persuade  investors  that  the  securities  were  safe  (Walter,  2010).  The 
Commission  majority  concluded,  “The  three  credit  rating  agencies  were  key 
enablers of the financial meltdown” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011, 
p. xxv). 
Could agency executives have recognized the risk sooner? Even if they were 
unaware (and some surely were not), their ignorance does not seem excusable. 
Some of their own analysts knew that they were giving high ratings to nearly 
worthless  securities  (Lowenstein,  2008;  U.S.  Senate,  2010).  If  they  knew  or 
should  have  known,  could  they  have  downgraded  the  securities  sooner?  The 
pressure  from  the  investment  banks  to  give  high  ratings  was  relentless.  The 
business of rating these securities accounted for nearly half of Moody’s revenue in 
the year before the collapse. But the agencies could have revised their ratings—as 
they eventually did anyhow, and with worse consequences for everyone than if 
they had acted sooner. 
It would be possible to identify the individuals who were responsible, but for 
purposes of organizational design that effort should be in the service of locating 
the structural problems that contributed to the failure. The most salient problem 
is another institutional conflict of interest—not the functional conflict we saw in 
the case of the MMS in oil drilling, but a classic financial one. The rating agencies’ 
interest  in  providing  accurate  assessments  conflicted  with  their  interest  in 
financial gain. Any agency that declined to give good ratings to the securities that - 9 - 
their  client  eagerly  wanted  to  sell  would  soon  lose  that  client  and  probably 
others.11 
Although  this  structural  problem  was  recognized  well  before  the  financial 
collapse and some steps have now been taken to address it, the conflict remains 
(Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011. pp. 211-12; Lynch, 2009; Office of 
the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, 2009, pp. 
136-37; U.S. Congress, 2010). The banks pay the agencies who rate the products 
that the banks want to sell to investors. Investors have no incentive to pay for 
their own ratings (which are not confidential and could be easily used by other, 
free-riding investors). The government is not in a position to take over the rating 
process  itself,  or  even  oversee  it  at  any  depth.  Under  these  challenging 
circumstances, how could responsibility for monitoring the ratings be designed 
into the system? 
A proposal described in an amendment to the Dodd–Frank bill, adopted by the 
Senate but dropped in the final legislation, would go some way toward addressing 
the problem (Congressional Record, 2010; Herszenhorn, 2010). It would require 
every new asset-based bond issue to be rated not by a rating agency chosen by the 
investment  bank  offering  the  security  but  by  an  agency  assigned  by  a  new 
independent board, on the model of a public utility, appointed and overseen by 
the  Security  and  Exchange  Commission.  The  board  would  choose  the  agency 
based on its competence and performance. The agencies would still be paid by 
the banks, but the banks could not shop around for their preferred ratings. They 
would pay the agency regardless of whether they liked the ratings. This structure 
would thus eliminate or at least drastically mitigate the institutional conflict of 
interest. 
For our purposes the significance of the proposal is to be found in the way the 
oversight responsibility is designed. Responsibility is assigned to the independent 
board,  not  for  reviewing  the  ratings  themselves,  not  even  for  overseeing  the 
practices of the rating agencies in their day-to-day business, but for maintaining 
standards  intended  to  encourage  agencies  to  produce  accurate  ratings.  It  is  a 
version of the vertical model of responsibility mentioned above, but without the 
duplication of function and potential regress that less differentiated versions of 
the model can generate. It also preserves individual responsibility. The hands 
that choose the agencies are identifiable, and they produce a record that could be 
used  to  identify  the  individuals  in  any  agency  who  are  not  following  best 
practices.  Having  this  kind  of  responsibility  regime  in  place  could  reduce  the 
likelihood that blame would have to be assigned in the future because it increases 
the incentives for blameless behavior in the present. 
Conclusion 
The problem of many hands is inherent in any complex organization. The failures 
of  governments  are  usually  the  result  of  decisions  and  nondecisions  by  many 
different  individuals,  many  of  whose  contributions  may  be  minimal  and 
unintended.  Yet  to  assign  responsibility  and  maintain  accountability  for  an 
outcome fairly and effectively, citizens have to identify individuals who knowingly 
and freely contribute to it. This individualist approach is necessary even if the 
purpose is not to punish or discipline individuals but to make changes in the 
organization to reduce the chances of adverse outcomes in the future. 
We can use the results of investigations into responsibility for past outcomes 
as  a  guide  for  making  changes  to  clarify  individual  responsibility  for  future 
outcomes and future oversight. Specifying the responsibility for monitoring the 
reforms  in  the  structures  and  in  the  culture  of  responsibility—design 
responsibility—is  often  neglected  but  is  no  less  important  than  assigning 
responsibility for outcomes. 
The commissions that examined the 9/11 response, the Deepwater Horizon oil 
spill, and the financial crisis were in effect engaged in this kind of investigation—
identifying  past  failures  of  responsibility  to  prevent  future  ones.  They  were 
successful  insofar  as  they  were  independent  and  knowledgeable,  and 
unsuccessful  insofar  as  they  were  not.  Notice  that  the  requirements  of - 10 - 
independence  and  knowledgeability  parallel  the  criteria  for  individual 
responsibility.  In  effect,  we  assess  the  responsibility  of  the  commissions  with 
criteria  analogous  to  those  by  which  they  should  assess  the  responsibility  of 
officials. 
The commissions not only examined failures in the past but also proposed 
institutions  to  strengthen  individual  responsibility  in  the  future.  The  most 
constructive reports at least implicitly recognized that changes in organizational 
design  are  not  self-executing,  confront  many  obstacles  (such  as  the  “traps” 
described by Argyris, 2012), and require ongoing attention and action. For that 
reason,  some  of  the  most  significant  recommendations  are  the  proposals  to 
establish oversight bodies, such as the citizens’ advisory council for oil drilling or 
the independent board for choosing rating agencies. The council, an example of a 
horizontal  oversight,  would  bring  a  different  perspective  to  balance  those  of 
government experts and industry executives. The board illustrates how vertical 
oversight  could  avoid  the  duplication  and  regress  in  designs  that  address  the 
problem of many hands by multiplying the hands. 
Whatever  their  other  functions,  oversight  bodies  such  as  these  could  be 
charged with holding individuals in the organization responsible on a continuing 
basis, and most importantly with exposing organizational defects that obstruct 
individual responsibility. They would in effect take responsibility for designing 
responsibility. 
Commissions  and  oversight  bodies,  properly  constituted,  can  be  important 
devices for mitigating the problem of many hands, but no less important is the 
rationale for establishing such institutions. We would be better able to identify 
the individuals who contribute to the failures of government and thereby reduce 
the chances of future failures if we refine the criteria of responsibility and extend 
their scope to encompass the design of institutions. This modified individualist 
approach to the problem of many hands can serve as a guide in the continuing 
effort to find ways to strengthen individual responsibility in government and hold 
its officials accountable to democratic citizens. 
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Notes 
1.  The responsibility-denying phrase comes from Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, 
defending  the  military  response  to  looting  and  disorder  in  Baghdad  after  the  U.S. 
invasion: “Think what’s happened in our cities when we’ve had riots, and problems, and 
looting. Stuff happens!” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2003). 
2.  The  problem  was  first  analyzed  in  these  terms  in  Thompson  (1980,  revised  1987, 
reprinted  2005).  The  “many  hands”  articles  have  generated  a  large  literature  that 
continues to grow. The most extended discussions are by Bovens (1998, 2005, 2007, 
2010), who carries the analysis further and proposes responses to the problem that are 
consistent with Thompson; and Smiley (1992), who criticizes Thompson’s conceptual 
criteria for responsibility. A formal analysis of the problem is given by Mastop (2010). 
The  Thompson  formulation  of  the  problem  has  proved  relevant  in  a  wide  range  of 
subjects and disciplines: public administration (Burke, 1986; Christensen & Laegreid, 
2002; Dobel, 1990; Pesch, 2008; Petter, 2005; Tong, 1985; van der Heijden, 2010), 
blame  attribution  (McGraw,  1990,  1991),  city  planning  forecasting  (Wachs,  1990), 
computing accountability (Nissenbaum, 1996), corporate management (Kaptein, 1998; 
Wempe,  1998),  crisis  management  (Boin,  Hart,  McConnell,  &  Preston,  2010), 
engineering (Cohen & Grace, 1994; Doorn, 2012; Doorn & Fahlquist, 2010; van Gorp, 
2005), criminal justice (DiIulio, 1988; Steiker & Steiker, 1995), European law (Bovens, 
2007),  financial  analysis  (Hildreth,  1983),  garbage  collection  ethics    (Rich,  1996), 
government  regulation  (Black,  2008),  health  care  (Leichter,  1992;  West,  2000), 
European  local  government  (Becquart-Leclercq,  1982;  Denton  &  Flinders,  2006; 
Sullivan,  2003),  law  of  war  (Bluhm  &  Heineman,  2007),  nanoethics  (van  de  Poel, 
2008),  organization  theory  (Dubnick,  2003;  Jos,  1988),  political  campaigning 
(Schedler,  1998),  professional  ethics  (DeMartino,  2011),  research  and  development 
networks (van de Poel & Zwart, 2010), resignation in protest (Dobel, 1999; Mulgan, 
2002), school governance (Allen & Mintrom, 2010), and technology assessment (Zwart, 
Van de Poel, Van Mil, & Brumsen, 2006). 
3.   “With regular incantations of ‘I accept full responsibility,’ an official strengthens his or 
her own political standing—by reassuring the public that someone is in charge and by 
projecting an image of a courageous leader who does not pass the buck . . . the ritual 
often quells public debate about a controversial decision or policy, effectively blocking 
further inquiry into the genuine moral responsibility of all of the officials involved . . .” 
(Thompson, 1980, p. 907). 
4.  For  example,  May  and  Hoffman  (1992).  An  exception  is  Miller  (2006)  who  has 
developed  a  cogent  individualist  account  of  collective  responsibility.  For  a  valuable 
overview, see Smiley (2011). 
5.  For a discussion of how under certain conditions collectivities can be blamed even if 
they are not properly regarded as human agents, see Scanlon (2008, pp. 160-66). 
6.  An organizational structure characterized by “many hands,” usually required by the 
technical  rationality  of  organizations,  may  be  regarded  as  another  “mask”  for  what 
Adams  and  Balfour  (2009)  call  administrative  evil  (acts  of  “pain  and  suffering  and 
death” inflicted by officials, who typically do not see that they are acting wrongly, pp. 4-
5, 11-13). To the extent that we can show that the presence of many hands does not 
eliminate individual responsibility, we in effect “unmask” another significant source of 
administrative wrongdoing. 
7.  Responsibility  and  accountability  are  often  used  interchangeably,  and  the  concepts 
overlap in many contexts. But if they are distinguished roughly in the way suggested in 
the text, the challenge of the problem of many hands can be seen as finding a way to 
bring responsibility more in line with accountability. The aim is to try to make sure that 
the  individuals  who  through  their  actions  or  omissions  contributed  to  a  failure  are 
those who are held accountable. Design responsibility is one way of bringing about this 
alignment:  it  would  create  structures  in  which  in  the  future  the  agents  to  be  held 
accountable  will  actually  be  responsible.  For  a  wide  ranging  critique  of  the  various 
concepts  of  responsibility  and  accountability  in  public  administration,  see  Harmon 
(1995). 
8. These criteria, which parallel the classic definition in Aristotle (1963, Bk. III.1-5), raise 
notoriously difficult philosophical issues. For a survey, see Eshleman (2009). For a 
legal analysis that informs the application of the criteria here, see Hart and Honoré 
(1959). 
9.  The accounts presented here are necessarily selective, and should be regarded more as 
illustrative sketches than conclusive assessments. Also, there are many other cases that 
invite a similar analysis and suggest similar lessons, notably the government response 
to Hurricane Katrina (Boin et al., 2010), the Enron scandal (Coffee, 2002; Gordon, - 12 - 
2002), and the Challenger disaster (Adams & Balfour, 2009, Chapter 5  ; Vaughan, 
1997). 
10.  The book that identifies the most hands is appropriately titled All the Devils Are Here 
(McLean & Nocera, 2010). As one reviewer wrote, “Some of us want to tie the financial 
crisis to Wall Street and Washington. Others want to blame greedy and ill-informed 
consumers,  rouge  traders  and  brokers,  out-of-control  lenders  and  people  with  a 
Pollyanna view of the world. McLean and Nocera make a convincing argument that it’s 
all of the above. And more” (McNay, 2010). For a discussion that links the financial 
collapse to broader historical and cultural trends in American society, see Adams and 
Balfour (2012). 
11. A similar institutional conflict of interest contributed to the Enron scandal: Enron’s 
auditors  (Arthur  Andersen)  did  not  ask  hard  questions  partly  because  they  had  an 
especially close relationship with Enron executives (Thompson, 2005, pp. 246-57, 261-
62). Like many accounting firms, Arthur Andersen had a large consulting contract with 
Enron, which was more lucrative than the auditing arrangement. Many of the financial 
executives at Enron had earlier worked at Arthur Andersen. 
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